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Trends In Harmonization Of 
Financing For Reproductive, 
Maternal, Newborn, And 
Child Health, 2008–13 
Abstract 
Donor financing to low- and middle-income countries for reproductive, maternal, 
newborn, and child health increased substantially from 2008 to 2013. However, 
increased spending by donors might not improve outcomes, if funds are delivered in 
ways that undermine countries’ public financial management systems and incur high 
transaction costs for project implementation. We combined quantitative and 
qualitative methods to examine the quality of funding for reproductive, maternal, 
newborn, and child health globally and in Tanzania, based on two principles of aid 
effectiveness: the alignment of donor financing with the recipient country’s public 
health financial management systems, and donor harmonization for coordinated, 
transparent, and collectively effective actions. We found that alignment of donor 
financing deteriorated throughout the period, with the proportion of funds channeled 
through governments decreasing from 47 percent to 39 percent. Tanzania-based 
donors attributed the change to pressure donors were under to achieve and show 
results. Donor harmonization was low overall and remained relatively constant, 
although it increased in sub-Saharan Africa and decreased in South Asia. Bilateral 
funding agencies were the most harmonized donors. We recommend that future 
assessments of Sustainable Development Goals financing include measures of 
harmonization and alignment of funding. 
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Official development assistance for health from wealthy countries to low- and 
middle-income countries quadrupled from $5 billion in 1990 to over $21 billion in 
2013.1 The increase was accompanied by an expansion of actors and initiatives in 
the health sector, including global health initiatives. Simultaneously, interest in the 
effectiveness of official development assistance has grown, a topic addressed in a 
series of high-level forums and international conferences—in Monterrey, Mexico 
(2002); Rome, Italy (2003); Paris, France (2005); Accra, Ghana (2008); Busan, 
South Korea (2011); Mexico City (2014); and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (2015)—each of 
which issued declarations. The Paris declaration articulated five principles of aid 
effectiveness: country ownership of national strategies; alignment of aid with country 
strategies; harmonization, or coordination, of donor aid; results for funding; and 
accountability between donors and aid recipients.2 These principles encourage 
providers of official development assistance to align their funding with a recipient 
country’s development strategies and systems, so that donors’ activities are 
harmonized, and recipients and donors focus on achieving results for which they are 
mutually accountable. 2 These principles form the core of declarations and 
conferences above, and have been collectively defined as the “global aid 
effectiveness agenda.”3 
Most of the literature to date on official development assistance for health has 
focused on tracking its distribution from donors to countries and its targeting to 
countries’ needs.4–8 Less attention has been paid to its effectiveness in relation to 
the Paris principles, although there is evidence that funding fragmentation,9 
volatility,10 and high transaction costs for recipient governments11 limit both the 
impact of official development assistance on health and the sustainability of progress 
already achieved. A 2014 report found progress in the use of country-results 
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frameworks and joint assessments of national strategies, but it reported reduced use 
of national financial management procedures and less predictable funding for 2015–
17.12 There have been further concerns that the focus on achieving global goals 
(including the Millennium Development Goals of the United Nations) and targets 
based on national averages have incentivized programs to focus on easily attained 
targets, thereby widening inequities13 and favoring specific health conditions and 
population groups.14,15 In addition, little attention has been paid to the adherence to 
aid effectiveness principles of health donors that target specific populations or 
diseases—despite recognition of the fact that providing assistance in the form of 
vertical projects (that is funds that are designated for specific diseases or population 
groups contribute to the proliferation of programs, fragmentation of programming, 
and transaction costs for national health ministries and hinders donor 
harmonization.16,17 
We used a mixed-methods approach to assess whether there were 
improvements in the alignment and harmonization of donor funding for reproductive, 
maternal, newborn, and child health between 2008 and 2013, both at the global level 
for donors and recipients and at the country level, using Tanzania as a case study. 
We focused on this funding because of the large increase in donor funding in recent 
years to low- and middle-income countries related to Millennium Development Goals 
4 and 5 (to improve child survival and maternal health, respectively).18 We used a 
case study to highlight how global trends affect national ministries and country-based 
donors. We selected Tanzania as our case study because it is a low-income 
recipient country that has a high degree of dependency on official development 
assistance and that experienced a substantial increase in external reproductive, 
maternal, newborn, and child health funding between 2008 and 2013.18 It is also a 
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country in which we have extensive experience working and living, and we are 
therefore familiar with its health systems and relevant stakeholders. 
Study Data And Methods 
Data Sources 
Quantitative data for both global and country-level analyses were extracted for 
the years 2008-13 from the Countdown ODA+ data set, which tracks flows of official 
development assistance (ODA)  and private funds from the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation (collectively referred to hereafter as ODA+ to reproductive, maternal, 
newborn, and child health.18,19 The data set includes information about sixty-four 
donors and 147 recipient countries and is based on the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development’s (OECD’s) Creditor Reporting System (CRS) 
database, to which it applies the Countdown project classification for reproductive, 
maternal, newborn, and child health (RMNCH).18 All records in the CRS are 
individually classified as RMNCH following the Countdown ODA+ framework18—in 
which both the full value of vertical projects (such as family planning, providing 
emergency obstetric care, and vaccinating children) and a proportion of the value of 
funding for primary health care, HIV prevention and treatment, health-sector budget 
support, general budget support, and so on are considered to promote reproductive, 
maternal, newborn, and child health.18 
For the qualitative component of the study, Melisa Martinez-Alvarez 
conducted semistructured interviews with members of the headquarters staff of four 
of the top ten donors to reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health (n = 4), 
representatives of donors in Tanzania (n = 7), and representatives of governmental 
and nongovernmental organizations working in the Tanzanian health sector (n = 15). 
The interviews explored whether and how principles of aid effectiveness are 
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considered in resource allocation and the perceptions of trends in resource allocation 
patterns over time and their consequences. A semistructured interview tool was used 
to guide the interviews (see the interview guide in the online Appendix).20 
Analytical Framework 
We developed an analytical framework to assess progress toward alignment 
and harmonization of official and Gates assistance to reproductive, maternal, 
newborn, and child health, based on the definitions in the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness2 that c uld be feasibly measured with our data (Appendix Table 1).20 
According to the Paris Declaration, alignment refers to the degree to which 
donors base their support on recipient countries’ national development strategies, 
institutions, and procedures.2 The Paris indicators to assess the alignment of donor 
funding focus on the proportion of official development assistance that uses national 
financial systems, is reported on national budgets, and is predictable and untied (can 
be used to purchase goods and services from any country), as well as the quality of 
country systems.2,21 The Countdown ODA+ data did not allow us to assess the 
proportion of funds reported on national budgets or the degree of tying official and 
Gates assistance to reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health. Instead, we 
assessed the proportion of funds disbursed through government systems; the 
proportion of funds that were pooled to assess the use of national financial systems; 
and the volatility of funds from the top ten donors of ODA+ for reproductive, 
maternal, newborn, and child health at the country level in Tanzania as a proxy for 
predictability.  
Tanzania received ODA+ for this area of health from twenty-eight to thirty-two 
donors during the study period. The top ten donors accounted for 88.2 percent of the 
funds (and therefore would have had the most impact on the volatility of funding); we 
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discuss only these funders in our analysis of volatility. We therefore measured 
alignment by the share of ODA+ delivered through government channels  by donor 
and by recipient country; the share of ODA+ delivered through the government that 
used pooled modalities rather than project funding; and volatility in total ODA+ to 
reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health disbursed by donors to 
Tanzania.22 
Harmonization is defined in the Paris Declaration as the degree to which 
donors’ actions are c ordinated, transparent, and collectively effective.2 The 
indicators used to evaluate harmonization according to that definition are the use of 
common arrangements and procedures and shared analysis.2,21 Our data did not 
allow us to systematically compare donors and recipient countries using these 
indicators. Furthermore, we did not consider them to be suitable ways to assess the 
impact of donor activities on recipient countries. Instead, we assessed the 
fragmentation and proliferation of funding for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and 
child health, which donors committed to reduce in the Paris2 and Accra Declarations. 
We did this at the global level through indices of dispersion by assessing donor 
proliferation and recipient-country fragmentation of funding. A donor is a high 
proliferator if it distributes its budget among many recipients and a low proliferator if it 
concentrates its budget among a small number of countries.11 Fragmentation refers 
to the number of donors in a given recipient country relative to the total official and 
Gates assistance for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health. A country is 
highly fragmented if there are many donors, each of which provides a small share of 
the total official and Gates assistance.11 
Data Analysis 
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We classified ODA+ to reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health as 
disbursed through the government if the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System 
database classified it as such (CRS channel codes 10000‒19999) or if the channel 
code was empty but the CRS aid type was general budget support (A01) or health-
sector budget support (A02). We manually classified projects as disbursed through 
the government if the “channel name” field indicated a government agency, and as 
outside the government if the same field indicated a nongovernmental organization. 
We considered ODA+ to reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health to have 
been delivered as pooled funds if the type of assistance was general budget support 
(CRS type A01), health-sector budget support (CRS type A02), or basket funds or 
pooled funding (CRS type B04) that were explicitly channeled through the 
government. We analyzed trends in aid type for the period 2009‒13, because data 
for 2008 were incomplete. 
Global Analysis 
We examined donor proliferation and recipient-country fragmentation of 
funding using the Theil and Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices, respectively11 (see the 
supplementary methods in Appendix),20  based on three-year averages of ODA+ to 
reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health in the period 200611 and the 
average in the period 2012‒13 to remove yearly variation.23 The Theil Index (which 
ranges from 0 to the natural log of the number of recipients) compares the amount 
disbursed by a donor to a country to the average amount disbursed by the donor per 
country. A smaller Theil Index indicates greater proliferation, or that there are many 
recipients that receive less than the average amount from a particular donor. The 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) compares the number of donors in a recipient 
country to the total amount of ODA+ to reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child 
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health that the country receives. It is estimated as a number between 1/n and 1, 
where n is the number of donors disbursing official development assistance to a 
recipient country. Larger values suggest concentration of ODA+ (in other words, that 
a single donor or small group of donors contribute a significant share of the 
assistance); smaller values indicate greater fragmentation in assistance (in other 
words, the assistance is distributed in small amounts by many donors). Therefore, 
the larger the HHI, the greater the degree of harmonization of ODA+. 
We generated measures of alignment and harmonization of funding for every 
donor and recipient country. We estimated averages across donor types (bilateral, 
multilateral, global health initiatives, and the Gates Foundation) and recipient country 
income groups (using the World Bank classification through 2016 per-capita gross 
national income of low- (<$1,005), lower-middle($1, 006-$3,955), upper-middle 
($3,956-$12,235), and high-income countries(>$12,236) )24. We categorized the 
European Union (EU) as a bilateral donor since EU institutions, rather than member 
states, ensure coherence and control spending for official development assistance.25 
We distinguished between multilaterals (made up of multiple members, including UN 
agencies and Bretton Woods institutions) and global health initiatives (single-issue 
agencies, including the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria and 
GAVI, the Vaccine Alliance). For 2013 we estimated ranges of values for channel, 
modality and fragmentation index [please provide] for each of the income groups 
(see Appendix Figure 1).20 We analyzed fragmentation across geographic regions. 
Tanzania Case Study 
To explore the alignment of donor funding with government strategies in 
Tanzania, we also examined volatility year by year in ODA+ to reproductive, 
maternal, newborn, and child health disbursements for each of the top ten donors in 
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the period 2008‒13. To measure fragmentation in Tanzania, we calculated the 
number of donors; the proportion of total ODA+ to reproductive, maternal, newborn, 
and child health that each donor represented; and the number of transactions for the 
period 2008‒13. We assumed that each record in the CRS database represented a 
transaction. Although a single project can be delivered as multiple transactions, each 
transaction incurs costs in terms of reports and meetings. 
For the qualitative analysis, interviews were recorded and transcribed. Data 
from the interviews were analyzed using thematic coding26 that was based on the 
analytical framework (for details, see Appendix Table 1).20 The coding framework 
was developed by Melisa Martinez-Alvarez and Josephine Borghi, and all coding 
was undertaken by Melisa Martinez-Alvarez. NVivo was used to manage the data. 
Qualitative analysis was undertaken after the analysis of quantitative data. The 
results of the analyses were integrated during the writing of this article. 
Limitations 
This study was subject to several methodological limitations. First, we 
assessed aid effectiveness in relation to the two principles that could be measured 
with our data. Other important principles of aid effectiveness (country ownership of 
national strategies, management for results, and mutual accountability of donors and 
recipients) were not addressed. These principles are difficult to assess across 
countries, since they require the use of qualitative methods to understand whether 
the mechanisms in place achieved their intended outcomes.3 In addition, we did not 
determine what the funds were spent on, despite the implications this may have for 
their effectiveness. Alignment and harmonization of funding could be measured in 
ways other than those used in this study. For instance, a measure of alignment 
should consider whether donor funding is filling gaps in national plans, but there is 
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no consistent methodology that can be used to assess this. Similarly, harmonization 
should be assessed according to the degree to which donors adopt common 
approaches in recipient countries. This is difficult to achieve across countries. An in-
depth case study in Tanzania found that despite coordination mechanisms’ being in 
place, internal donor structures and incentives were hindering harmonization efforts.3 
Furthermore, our definition of aid effectiveness was restricted to the code of good 
practice outlined by the global aid effectiveness agenda, instead of being based on 
an evaluation of the impact of different modalities for official and Gates assistance on 
reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health outcomes. 
Second, there were some limitations to our data. Information in the 
Countdown ODA+ database was manually coded by different people in different 
years, and although the team performed consistency checks, some bias may have 
still been introduced.19 In addition, we made assumptions about the proportions of  
funds for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health that were delivered as 
general or health-sector budget support, since donors indicated only the funding 
modality, not its subsequent allocation to reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child 
health.18 In Tanzania, general budget support is disbursed through the Ministry of 
Finance, so including this type of financing might have resulted in an overestimation 
of the number of transactions that the Ministry of Health managed. However, we do 
not anticipate this to be substantial. Our estimates of official and Gates assistance 
for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health differ from those previously 
reported in Countdown ODA+ analyses18 because we excluded funds reported as 
regional disbursements—since we were interested in aid flows to specific recipient 
countries. By considering only funds disbursed through the government if that was 
the channel recorded in the CRS database, we might have underestimated the 
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amount of funds delivered through a third partner but ultimately disbursed to 
governments (for instance, GAVI disburses 74.3 percent of its official and Gates 
assistance for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health through UNICEF). 
In addition, we were not able to unpack the drivers of funding allocation. However, 
this is the subject of future work currently being undertaken by the authors.  
Finally, only Martinez-Alvarez conducted the interviews and analyzed the 
qualitative data. This may have biased both the participants’ responses and how 
they were interpreted. 
Study Results 
Alignment Of Donor Funding 
In the period 2009‒13, 40.9 percent of official and Gates assistance for 
reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health was delivered through 
governments (Exhibit 1). On average, in the period 2008‒13, global health initiatives 
delivered 44.3 percent of their funds through governments; the shares for bilaterals 
and multilaterals were 38.5 percent and 58.7 percent, respectively (Appendix Table 
2).20 Of the top ten donors, those channeling the highest proportions of funds 
through governments were Germany (81.3 percent) and the Global Fund (61.7 
percent), and those channeling the lowest proportions were the Gates Foundation 
(1.4 percent) and GAVI (9.7 percent) (Appendix Table 3).20 In the same period, the 
share of funds for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health disbursed 
through government channels declined from 46.6 percent to 38.7 percent (Exhibit 2). 
Bilateral agencies and global health initiatives reduced their funding through 
governments, while the funding of multilaterals increased in 2009 and then stayed 
constant. 
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In the period 2009‒13, for those donors delivering official and Gates 
assistance for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health through government 
channels, only 12.9 percent of the assistance, on average, was delivered as pooled 
funds with other donors, with 82.0 per cent being disbursed as project funding (there 
was insufficient information to estimate the modality of the remainder 5.1 percent) 
(Appendix Table 4).20 Of the top ten donors, Canada (86.0 percent), EU institutions 
(61.7 percent), and the United Kingdom (32.8 percent) disbursed the highest 
proportion of their funds through governments as pooled funds (Appendix Table 4).20 
Eighteen donors disbursed none of their funds to governments as pooled funding, 
including the Global Fund, GAVI, and the Gates Foundation. The share of 
government funds pooled across all donors increased from 7.5 percent in 2009 to 
18.2 percent in 2011 and then decreased to 13.1 percent in 2013 (Exhibit 3). 
Between 2008 and 2013, disbursements of total official and Gates assistance 
for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health through government channels 
increased for lower-middle- and low-income countries (from $1,403.5 million to 
$2,035.3 million and from $1,292.7 million to $1,785.8 million, respectively) (Exhibit 
4); however, as a proportion of total ODA+ to reproductive, maternal, newborn, and 
child health, funds through the government decreased in both income groups (from 
45.9 percent to 39.3 percent and from 47.0 percent to 36.2 percent, respectively) 
(Appendix Table 5)20.). Of the funds channeled through the government, 9.6 percent 
were delivered as pooled funds with other donors in lower-middle-income countries, 
and 15.8 percent were delivered as pooled funds in low-income countries. Trends in 
alignment showed a high degree of heterogeneity (Appendix Figure 1);20 although 
the top three recipients received about half of their funds for reproductive, maternal, 
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newborn, and child health through their governments (Nigeria 46.6 percent, Ethiopia 
45.9 percent, and Kenya 41.4 percent) (data not shown). 
Qualitative findings showed that donors’ headquarters staff members had 
concerns about the use of pooled funds, given the need for control and 
accountability to their own governments that resources are spent in appropriate 
ways. 
One staff member said: “For us as an agencyR, the solution is not, 
essentially, to have all the funds in one basket and then make grants to countries; 
we have some specific things that we need to try to accomplish.R The degree of 
control and accountability that we need, therefore—it’s usually not going to be 
satisfied by, essentially, having all of our funds in global mechanisms.” 
Harmonization Of Donor Funding 
On average, donors provided official and Gates assistance for reproductive, 
maternal, newborn, and child health to about forty five recipient countries between 
2006 and 2013. Seven donors donated to more than a hundred recipient countries, 
including three of the top ten donors (the United States donated to 110.6 countries, 
the Global Fund to 109.2, and the European Union to 110.7) (Appendix Table 7).20 
For most donors, the Theil Index was less than or near 1.0, which indicates high 
proliferation of funding—that is, disbursement of small levels of official and Gates 
assistance for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health to many countries. 
The Theil Index overall was relatively unchanged between 2006–08 (0.95) and 
2012–13 (0.99) (Appendix Figure 2).20 Multilaterals had higher levels of proliferation 
of funding, with a Theil Index of 0.57 in 2006–08 and 0.72 in 2012–13, than bilaterals 
(Theil Index: 1.12 and 1.11, respectively). The Gates Foundation had the lowest 
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levels of proliferation of funding (Theil Index: 1.49 in 2009–11 and 1.91 in 2012–13) 
(Appendix Figure 2).20 
In a given year in the period 2008‒13, recipient countries received official and 
Gates assistance for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health from an 
average of 15.4 donors, although five countries had more than 30.0 donors 
(Mozambique had 32.6; Tanzania and Kenya each had 31.4; and Afghanistan and 
Ethiopia each had 30.2) (data not shown). There was little change in the 
fragmentation of funding over time (the HHI was around 0.32for the time interval 
averages across the time period) (Appendix Table 9).20 However, fragmentation was 
reduced for countries in sub-Saharan Africa (HHIs  0.23 in 2006–08 and 0.26 in 
2012–13) and in Latin America and the Caribbean (HHIs: 0.39 and 0.44, 
respectively), whereas it increased in South Asia (HHIs: 0.19 and 0.15, respectively) 
(Appendix Table 8).20 Official and Gates assistance for reproductive, maternal, 
newborn, and child health was more fragmented across low-income countries, 
although there was substantial variation within country income groups (Appendix 
Figure 1c).20 
Our qualitative research findings showed that bilateral donor representatives 
were especially concerned about the risk of proliferation of donors in recipient 
countries. Other donor types acknowledged that the risk of proliferation of donors 
was not explicitly considered when allocating funds to countries, with allocations 
based on priority areas and country proposals. Most staff members in donor 
headquarters who participated in our interviews agreed that fragmentation increases 
transaction costs for recipient governments, hinders the coordination of donors with 
different priorities and funding models, and risks duplication of efforts. However, one 
Page 14 of 68Health Affairs
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
“MARTINEZ-ALVAREZ_aug_31_2017.docx”; 8/31; dl 9/6; lw 9/6; lw 
to jf 9/6; names checked 9/6, jf to az 9/15; az to lw 9/29; jf 
to lw 10/2; lw to au 10/2; 
 
15 
 
headquarters staff member did not think that “having multiple partners engaged on 
common issues is inherently a problem.” 
Tanzania Case Study 
Tanzania received US$2.6 billion of official and Gates assistance for 
reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health in the period 2008‒13. The top ten 
donors accounted for 86.0 percent of all funds, with just the top two (the United 
States and the Global Fund) making up 55.8 percent of all of the assistance. 
Assistance delivered through government channels decreased from 69.9 percent of 
the total assistance in 2008 to 52.8 percent in 2013, and the share of funds 
channeled through the government but pooled with funds from other donors 
decreased from 2011 to 2013 (Appendix Figure 3a).20 There was increased reliance 
on project funding, from 49.0 percent of the assistance in 2008 to 90.9 percent in 
2013 (Appendix Figure 3a).20 In the same period, the United States delivered 40.7 
percent of its funds through the Tanzanian government, compared to 80.1 percent 
for the Global Fund (data not shown). Neither donor disbursed money as pooled 
funds with other donors. 
Official and Gates assistance for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child 
health in Tanzania was highly volatile over the period 2008‒13. With the exception of 
the United States, disbursements from the top ten donors fluctuated considerably 
(Appendix Figure 3c).20 Fluctuations were greatest for Global Fund disbursements, 
which oscillated between $61.0 million and $124.9 during the period (Appendix 
Figure 3c).20 
In our qualitative research, Tanzania-based respondents reported that donors 
had disbursed funds through the government without giving sufficient consideration 
to strengthening health financial management capacity. As a result, donors had been 
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disappointed by the results obtained, which—coupled with increased pressures to 
“attribute [money] to results”—meant that donors had reverted to funding projects 
instead of using pooled approaches with other donors. 
One representative of a donor said: “Everybody thought we had found the 
Holy Grail, but I think now the people are a little bit more critical and realize that it's 
not that easy. And now we see another move—moving away from [general budget 
support and health-]sector budget support and back to projects, and putting the flag 
(meaning attributing results to their funding).” 
The average number of donors disbursing official and Gates assistance for 
reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health in Tanzania increased from 
twenty-eight in 2006–08 to thirty-five in 2012–13 (Appendix Table 9).20 
Fragmentation of donor funding increased slightly between 2009‒11 (HHI: 0.21) and 
2012‒13 (HHI: 0.18). The assistance was delivered as 2,563 transactions in 2008, 
increasing to 4,258 transactions in 2011 (Appendix Figure 3b).20 The United States 
and Global Fund accounted for 161 and 11 of these transactions in 2008 and 225 
and 9 transactions in 2013, respectively (data not shown). 
Like donor headquarters staff members, most donor representatives 
interviewed in our qualitative research in Tanzania reported concerns about the 
levels of fragmentation of funding and its impact on the quality of the dialogue 
between the government and donors. One representative based in Tanzania said, 
“There are so many activities and initiatives and implementing agencies that the 
dialogue often remains very general, and at a higher level we are not able, because 
of the multitude of actors, to coordinate all activities very well.” 
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However, another interviewee perceived that fragmentation of donor funding 
resulted in “a more active dialogue in health,” with “more substance in the 
discussions between donors and government in the health sector.” 
Discussion 
Our study analyzed trends in the period 2008‒13 in two key principles of aid 
effectiveness: the alignment of donor funding with country strategies and financial 
management systems and the harmonization of the funding with that of other donors 
in relation to official and Gates assistance for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and 
child health. We found little evidence of improvement in donors’ adherence to either 
principle overall, although we identified both improvements and deteriorations in 
some metrics for certain donors and recipients. Alignment of the assistance 
deteriorated in the study period, with most donors moving away from pooled funding 
supplied by multiple donors. Harmonization of donor funding remained constant, 
despite increased funding for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health. 
High levels of fragmentation of funding at the country level remain a concern, as 
demonstrated by the case of Tanzania. 
Achieving alignment of donor funding with country strategies requires that 
donors use a country’s institutional and management arrangements, which we 
assessed as the proportion of funds that were pooled by multiple donors and 
delivered through government channels. In the study period, fewer than half of all 
reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health funds from donors to recipient 
countries were delivered through governments, and the share of donor funding to 
governments decreased over time across lower-middle- and low-income countries. 
This is surprising, given donors’ commitments to the Paris Declaration and its five 
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principles, which call for greater alignment of donor funding with recipient countries’ 
priorities and systems than was typical in the past.  
We found substantial variation across donor types: Multilaterals disbursed the 
highest proportion of funds through governments, while some of the largest bilateral 
donors disbursed the majority of their funds through nongovernment channels (for 
instance, the United States disbursed 65.4 percent of its funds this way). By pooling 
funds with other donors, donors could create an effective means of aid coordination, 
but we found that donors’ enthusiasm for pooling funds has decreased in recent 
years, as shown by the decrease in the share of pooled funds (from 18.2 percent in 
2011 to 13.1 percent in 2013).  
These trends are concerning because they represent a reversal of gains 
perceived by our country-level participants in increased donor coordination and 
greater government control of funds. While still aligned to government systems, 
project funding channeled by donors through governments increases transaction 
costs, since each project requires separate negotiation, management, and 
reporting.11 Projects delivered outside the government are the least coordinated with 
or aligned to country strategies. Results from our qualitative research showed that 
donor disillusionment with progress and the desires to control funds and for greater 
accountability to domestic populations of donor countries—to make it possible to 
demonstrate the effective use of funds—are making these modalities more attractive. 
Our results are similar to those of a study in Uganda.14 
Funding volatility at the country level was also substantial, as seen in 
Tanzania. Year-by-year fluctuation of funds makes it hard for governments to plan 
activities and honor their commitments to their citizens.27 This is particularly 
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worrisome, as the poorest countries have been shown to be more likely to receive 
unpredictable amounts of official development assistance.10 
Through international agreements, donors have repeatedly committed to 
becoming more harmonized with other donors by increasing the concentration of 
funding.2,28 We found that the proliferation of official and Gates assistance for 
reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health remained relatively constant over 
time. Proliferation was lowest for bilateral donors and the Gates Foundation. 
Multilateral donors and global health initiatives have resource-funding formulas that 
require them to fund all eligible countries. Therefore, we would have expected them 
to spread their funds more evenly, but we would have expected bilaterals to make 
further strides toward concentration of funding. Two studies that explored trends in 
overall concentration of official development assistance also reported little 
progress.23,29 
We found little change between 2008 and 2013 in fragmentation trends for 
official and Gates assistance for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health at 
the country level. However, low-income countries received the most fragmented 
funds, with fragmentation levels falling in sub-Saharan Africa  and increasing in Asia 
. The fact that funds became less fragmented in sub-Saharan Africa despite 
increases in funding and the number of donors suggests that funds were 
concentrated among few donors—which is encouraging. Nevertheless, some of the 
poorest countries still had high levels of fragmentation in funding, as seen in 
Tanzania. This is consistent with findings from a study of official development 
assistance for health.9 High degrees of proliferation and fragmentation in funding 
decrease the effectiveness of the assistance by increasing transaction costs for the 
recipient government and hindering coordination with other donors,11 especially 
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when donors are disbursing funds through their own projects outside of government 
channels. Arne Bigsten and Sven Tengstam attribute a lack of harmonization to 
donors’ having differing goals, and a tendency to micromanage developmental 
projects and to the possibility of some donors becoming free riders when there is 
harmonization of funding.30 
Policy Implications 
The findings from this study suggest the need for reflection on the future of 
official development assistance to low- and middle-income countries. There have 
been concerns about the stagnation of donor health-sector funding,31 and indeed 
only one of the United Nations’ seventeen Sustainable Development Goals to be 
achieved by 2030 directly addresses health (compared to three of the Millennium 
Development Goals). However, it is not enough to advocate for increased funding, 
particularly if funds are delivered for separate projects by myriad donors with diverse 
requirements. With a higher number of goals and indicators for the Sustainable 
Development Goals than for the Millennium Development Goals, there is potential for 
increasing the fragmentation and recipient countries’ transaction costs of official 
development assistance. It may be unrealistic to expect UN agencies to concentrate 
this assistance, but they could reduce transaction costs by coordinating funds in a 
given country—for instance, through delegated cooperation mechanisms. In addition, 
there is no agreed-on ideal level of fragmentation of funding, and too much 
concentration of funding may also be harmful.11 The key may be to find a balance 
between meeting recipients’ needs and not undermining the effectiveness of official 
development assistance. 
Better methods are also needed to assess that effectiveness. A previous 
study showed that the Paris Declaration principles are broad and multidimensional, 
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while the indicators proposed to assess progress are narrow and imprecise and rely 
too heavily on quantitative data.3 The indicators used in our study capitalize on 
publicly available data to compare countries globally. However, they do not capture 
some principles of aid effectiveness (notably country ownership of national 
strategies, management for results, or accountability), nor do they capture all 
aspects of alignment and harmonization (such as donors’ ability to fill gaps in 
national strategies or coordinate in-country activities). Country ownership of national 
strategies, management for results and accountability are best assessed 
qualitatively. Therefore, there is a need for more single- or multicountry case studies, 
as well as better methods to assess qualitative indicators globally (for instance, 
surveys that assess global aid effectiveness declarations could include open-ended 
questions).3 
Conclusion 
When donors are assessed for their support in implementing the Sustainable 
Development Goals, they should be held accountable not only for how much they 
disburse to achieve different goals or subgoal targets, but also for how aligned their 
funds are with national health plans, how the funds are disbursed, and the number of 
donors already operating in the health sector. Our study has shown that it is possible 
to monitor the alignment and harmonization of donor funds by using existing data 
sources and country case studies. The Global Financing Facility is a financing 
instrument launched at the Financing for Development Conference in Addis Ababa in 
2015  in an effort to strengthen the Paris principles by improving domestic and donor 
resources for reproductive, maternal, newborn, child, and adolescent health in sixty-
three high-burden countries. It will be important to link this initiative with processes to 
monitor progress toward the Sustainable Development Goals. 
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Exhibit list 
Exhibit 1 (figure) 
CAPTION: Total official development assistance for reproductive, maternal, 
newborn, and child health, by donor, channel, and modality, 2009–13 
Source/Notes: SOURCE Authors’ analysis of data from the Countdown ODA+ 
database. NOTES Channels include governments and private and nonprofit 
organizations. “Other bilaterals” include all bilateral funders other than the United 
States and the United Kingdom (such as the European Union). IDA is the 
International Development Agency of the World Bank. “Other multilaterals” include all 
multilateral funding agencies other than the World Bank (such as the United Nations 
and development banks). The Global Fund is the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis, and Malaria. BMGF is the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. 
 
Exhibit 2 (figure) 
CAPTION: Percentages of official development assistance for reproductive, 
maternal, newborn, and child health delivered through government channels, by 
donor type, 2008–13 
Source/Notes: SOURCE Authors’ analysis of data from the Countdown ODA+ 
database. NOTES BMGF is the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. GHI is global 
health initiatives (defined in the text). 
 
Exhibit 3 (figure) 
CAPTION: Percentages of official development assistance for reproductive, 
maternal, newborn, and child health delivered through government channels and 
disbursed as pooled funds (with those of other donors), by donor type, 2008–13 
Source/Notes: SOURCE Authors’ analysis of data from the Countdown ODA+ 
database. NOTES The percentages for global health initiatives (defined in the text) 
and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation were zero. 
 
Exhibit 4 (figure) 
CAPTION: Total disbursements of official development assistance for reproductive, 
maternal, newborn, and child health, by channel and modality and recipient-country 
income group, 2009–13 
Source/Notes: SOURCE Authors’ analysis of data from the Countdown ODA+ 
database. NOTES Amounts are in constant 2013 US dollars.  “Government pooled” 
includes donor funds disbursed through government channels and pooled with funds 
of other donors. “Government other” includes funds delivered through governments 
for which the modality could not be specified.  “Nongovernment” includes all funds 
delivered outside of the government, whether or not the modality could be specified. 
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Supplementary methods 
A. Interview guide 
1. Introduction 
a. Introduce aim and objectives of projects 
b. Introduce aim of the interview 
c. Ask for permission to record, explain what the results will be used for and 
procedures for anonymising data 
d. Ask for permission to quote and  
2. Introduce interviewees 
a. What their job involves 
b. How long they have worked at X agency 
3. How are decisions of funding allocation made in your agency? 
a. What is the decision-making process? 
i. Who is involved? 
ii. What procedures are involved? 
4. How does your agency decide on how much to invest in RMNCH? 
a. Versus total health ODA 
b. Versus total ODA 
5. How does your agency decide which countries to invest in? the size of investment? 
a. Country-level factors – disease, need, history 
b. Aid effectiveness 
6. How does your agency decide on the size of each project? 
7. Once in-country 
a. Does your agency work with other donors?  
i. If so how and why? 
ii. What are the advantages and disadvantages of this? 
b. Does your agency work with (recipient country) governments? 
i. If so how and why? 
ii. What are the advantages and disadvantages of this? 
8. In you view, is fragmentation a problem for the effectiveness of ODA to RMNCH and your 
agency’s projects in particular? 
a. If so how? 
b. How does your agency deal with this? 
9. In your view, is your agency’s ODA to RMNCH effective?  
a. Why? 
b. How could it be improved? 
10. Challenges and important issues for the future 
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B. Theil and Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices  
We calculated the Theil index through the weighted value of a ratio of actual amount donated to a 
recipient and the mean value a given donor donates: 

∑



 ln , where N is number of 
recipients, ln expresses the natural log,  is the amount a recipient i receives, and  is the mean 
amount received across recipients. If a donor gave an equal amount to all recipients, then the Theil 
value would be 0; and if a donor heavily favours one recipient whilst also giving to more than a few 
recipients (say, N>5) then the Theil value converges to the natural log of N.  There are different 
versions of the Theil Index, in the present context the important aspect is that the amount donated 
by a donor to a country is compared to the average amount donated to all countries by the donor, 
through the corresponding ratio:	ln ; thus, many small donations in comparison to the mean will 
produce a small Theil number. The log term above would be negative in this case for a lot of 
recipients. This would be characteristic of a proliferator.
1
 The global number of recipients is above 
100, the overall donations made to the countries by a multi-lateral should result in a small Theil 
index due to many small recipients.  However, a bilateral donor can restrict the number of 
recipients; there is no specific reason why it cannot concentrate in giving aid to only a few countries.  
Thus, a small Theil index value for bilateral should be worrisome.  
The HH index is expressed as the following, ∑  = 	,	 where   represents the share of 
total aid donor i gives to the recipient. The smallest value would occur if all donors gave the same 
amount to country i, and the largest value would occur if there were only a single donor. 
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Figure 1: Variations around the income country group average in 2013 for proportion of ODA+ to RMNCH disbursed through the government, proportion of 
ODA+ to RMNCH pooled and the fragmentation index 
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Figure 2: Theil index of donor proliferation between 2006-2008 and 2012-2013 by donor type 
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Figure 3. ODA+ to RMNCH to Tanzania by a) modality, b) number of transactions and c) year-on-year variation of the top 10 donors 
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Table 1. Definitions, indicators, and measurement strategy for assessing the alignment and harmonisation of ODA+ to RMNCH  
Principle 
Paris Declaration 
definition 
Indicator  Measurement strategy 
Alignment 
Donors base their overall 
support on partner 
countries’ national 
development strategies, 
institutions and 
procedures. 
ODA+ to RMNCH delivered 
through government channels / 
Total ODA+ to RMNCH 
Global trends by donor and recipient country 
(2008-2013) 
ODA+ to RMNCH to government 
channels that is pooled / ODA+ 
to RMNCH to government 
Global trends by donor and recipient country 
(2009-2013) 
Individual donor volatility  Trends in total ODA+ to RMNCH disbursed by top 
10 donors to Tanzania (2008-2013) 
Harmonisation 
Donors’ actions are more 
harmonised, transparent 
and collectively effective. 
Donor proliferation Trends in Theil index at the global level for all 
donors (2008-2013) 
Recipient fragmentation Trends in Herfindahl-Hirschman index at the 
global level for all recipient countries (2008-
2013) 
Number of transactions Trends in Tanzania (2008-2013) 
   
 
  
Page 38 of 68Health Affairs
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
Table 2. ODA+ to RMNCH by channel and modality for each donor type between 2008 and 2013 (all values presented in constant 2013 USD millions) 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Bilateral 
       
Total ODA+ to RMNCH 4,128.7  4,935.8  5,552.2  5,634.1  6,094.5  6,486.4  32,831.6  
ODA+ to RMNCH through 
government  (% of total) 
1,784.6 
(43.2%) 
2,054.7 
(41·6%) 
2,203.1 
(39·7%) 
2,188.4 
(38·8%) 
2,156.7 
(35·4%) 
2,249.0 
(34·7%) 
12,636.5 
(38·5%) 
ODA+ to RMNCH pooled (% 
ODA+ to RMNCH delivered 
through government) 
 
153.5 (7·5%) 
350.3 
(15·8%) 
585.4 
(26·7%) 
460.6 
(21·4%) 
517.3 
(23·0%) 
2,167.2 
(17·2%) 
Multilateral 
       
Total ODA+ to RMNCH  916.9  1,207.7  1,051.9  1,167.8  1,007.7  1,145.6  6,497.6  
ODA+ to RMNCH through 
government (% of total) 
433.9 
(47.3%) 
748.9 
(62.0%) 
625.6 
(59.5%) 
696.1 
(59.6%) 
624.7 
(62.0%) 
681.9 
(59·5%) 
3,811.1 
(58.7%) 
ODA+ to RMNCH pooled (% 
ODA+ to RMNCH delivered 
through government) 
 
121.6 
(16.2%) 
75.2 (12.0%) 72.5 (10.4%) 61.6 (9·9%) 39.4 (5·8%) 443.0 (11.6%) 
BMGF        
Total ODA+ to RMNCH  165.0 141.8 281.4 266.2 214.5 1068.9 
ODA+ to RMNCH through 
government (% of total) 
 3.5 (2.1%) 2.1 (1.4%) 2.9 (1.0%) 2.9 (1.1%) 3.6 (1.7%) 15.0 (1.4%) 
ODA+ to RMNCH pooled (% 
ODA+ to RMNCH delivered 
through government) 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 
GHI  
       
Total ODA+ to RMNCH 
1,557.7 1,548.4  2,052.8  1,797.7  2,495.9  3,105.1  12,557.7  
ODA+ to RMNCH through 
government (% of total) 
860.0 
(52.2%) 
864.9 
(55.9%) 
1,036.4 
(50.5%) 
718.6 
(40.0%) 
782.3 
(31.3%) 
1,305.7 
(42.0%) 
5,567.8 
(44.3%) 
ODA+ to RMNCH pooled (% 
ODA+ to RMNCH delivered  
0 0 0 0 0 0 
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 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
through government) 
Total 6,603.3  7,856.8  8,798.7  8,881.0  9,864.3  10,951.5  52,955.7  
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Table 3
1
: ODA+ to RMNCH through the government by donor as a proportion of total ODA+ to 
RMNCH for that donor (2008-2013, constant 2013 US dollars) 
Donor 
Total ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
ODA+ to RMNCH 
through gov't 
ODA+ to RMNCH through gov’t  
as % of total ODA+ to RMNCH 
Bilateral    
Australia 1069.3 204.5 19.1% 
Austria 34.1 10.5 30.7% 
Belgium 330.3 181.5 55.0% 
Canada 1624.8 253.9 15.6% 
Czech Republic 5.3 0.9 16.1% 
Denmark 344.8 163.3 47.4% 
Estonia 0.4 0.0 3.8% 
EU Institutions 2500.0 1031.3 41.3% 
Finland 118.2 24.9 21.1% 
France 373.7 318.6 85.3% 
Germany 1402.8 1140.2 81.3% 
Greece 8.9 7.3 81.2% 
Iceland 4.0 2.5 60.7% 
Ireland 322.7 132.2 41.0% 
Italy 245.8 140.6 57.2% 
Japan 1203.7 580.4 48.2% 
Korea 268.6 228.6 85.1% 
Luxembourg 129.0 56.4 43.7% 
Netherlands 561.8 266.5 47.4% 
New Zealand 59.2 21.4 36.2% 
Norway 556.5 136.4 24.5% 
Poland 0.6 0.4 56.1% 
Portugal 27.5 18.9 68.9% 
Slovak Republic 0.3 
 
0.0% 
Slovenia 1.3 0.2 15.4% 
Spain 549.1 105.4 19.2% 
Sweden 567.0 136.4 24.1% 
Switzerland 210.3 55.1 26.2% 
United Arab 
Emirates 162.4 94.0 57.9% 
United Kingdom 3850.5 1682.5 43.7% 
United States 16298.3 5641.7 34.6% 
BMGF 1068.9 15.0 1.4% 
GHI 12557.7 5567.8 44.3% 
GAVI 4201.9 408.7 9.7% 
Global Fund 8355.8 5159.2 61.7% 
Multilateral 6497.6 3811.1 58.7% 
AfDB 0.6 0.6 100.0% 
AfDF 254.7 202.1 79.4% 
Arab Fund (AFESD) 5.9 
 
0.0% 
                                                            
1
 Donors with more than 50% of NULL Channel and empty values excluded, as well as UNAIDS that had 100% 
coded as other 
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Donor 
Total ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
ODA+ to RMNCH 
through gov't 
ODA+ to RMNCH through gov’t  
as % of total ODA+ to RMNCH 
AsDB Special Funds 200.3 200.3 100.0% 
BADEA 4.3 0.1 1.2% 
GEF 0.7 0.3 38.6% 
IDA 3032.0 2785.0 91.9% 
IDB Sp.Fund 111.8 66.3 59.3% 
IMF (Concessional 
Trust Funds) 316.4 316.4 100.0% 
Kuwait (KFAED) 18.3 12.1 66.5% 
OFID 41.7 
 
0.0% 
UNAIDS 157.3 
 
0.0% 
UNDP 50.3 14.3 28.5% 
UNFPA 743.3 213.5 28.7% 
UNICEF 1020.9 
 
0.0% 
UNPBF 0.8 
 
0.0% 
UNRWA 280.3 
 
0.0% 
WFP 120.2 
 
0.0% 
WHO 137.8 
 
0.0% 
Grand Total 52955.7 22030.4 41.6% 
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Table 4. Total ODA+ to RMNCH, ODA+ to RMNCH through the government and ODA+ to RMNCH pooled by donor between 2009 and 2013 (constant 2013 US 
dollars) 
Donor 
Total ODA+ 
to RMNCH 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
delivered 
through gov't 
ODA+ to RMNCH 
to the government 
delivered as 
pooled funds 
ODA+ to RMNCH 
to the government 
delivered as 
projects 
ODA+ to RMNCH to 
the government 
modality unknown 
% ODA+ to RMNCH 
through the gov't 
delivered as 
pooled funds 
% ODA+ to RMNCH 
through the gov't 
delivered as 
projects 
Bilateral        
Australia 958.4 181.8 94.6 48.6 38.7 52.0% 26.7% 
Austria 27.3 8.5 2.5 5.9 0.0 30.0% 69.9% 
Belgium 280.3 148.7 31.7 86.0 31.0 21.3% 57.8% 
Canada 1441.2 239.1 205.6 17.2 16.4 86.0% 7.2% 
Czech Republic 5.3 0.9 
 
0.2 0.7 0.0% 18.8% 
Denmark 293.6 136.9 47.6 79.4 9.8 34.8% 58.0% 
Estonia 0.4 0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0% 100.0% 
EU Institutions 2183.6 814.0 502.6 216.3 95.1 61.7% 26.6% 
Finland 96.9 19.5 13.4 1.7 4.4 68.6% 8.6% 
France 334.0 282.2 20.8 198.4 63.0 7.4% 70.3% 
Germany 1189.8 966.8 91.9 804.1 70.9 9.5% 83.2% 
Greece 5.8 4.5 2.1 0.2 2.2 46.2% 4.4% 
Iceland 4.0 2.5 
 
2.5 
 
0.0% 100.0% 
Ireland 259.5 106.4 79.4 4.7 22.3 74.6% 4.4% 
Italy 188.5 101.3 0.6 69.0 31.8 0.6% 68.1% 
Japan 1055.2 503.0 29.1 440.8 33.1 5.8% 87.6% 
Korea 242.6 204.1 
 
174.5 29.7 0.0% 85.5% 
Luxembourg 95.8 45.5 
 
34.6 10.8 0.0% 76.2% 
Netherlands 460.9 207.8 125.6 30.2 52.1 60.4% 14.5% 
New Zealand 48.7 18.0 12.8 3.4 1.8 71.0% 18.7% 
Norway 455.6 106.4 71.9 7.9 26.7 67.5% 7.4% 
Poland 0.6 0.4 
 
0.3 0.0 0.0% 89.1% 
Portugal 24.4 17.1 0.9 15.5 0.7 5.2% 90.5% 
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Donor 
Total ODA+ 
to RMNCH 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
delivered 
through gov't 
ODA+ to RMNCH 
to the government 
delivered as 
pooled funds 
ODA+ to RMNCH 
to the government 
delivered as 
projects 
ODA+ to RMNCH to 
the government 
modality unknown 
% ODA+ to RMNCH 
through the gov't 
delivered as 
pooled funds 
% ODA+ to RMNCH 
through the gov't 
delivered as 
projects 
Slovak Republic 0.3 
 Slovenia 1.3 0.2 
 
0.1 0.1 0.0% 35.2% 
Spain 383.4 79.3 26.6 30.5 22.2 33.5% 38.5% 
Sweden 476.6 95.5 55.9 16.8 22.7 58.6% 17.6% 
Switzerland 179.1 41.1 20.6 12.0 8.4 50.2% 29.2% 
United Arab 
Emirates 162.4 94.0 30.5 47.3 16.2 32.5% 50.3% 
United 
Kingdom 3363.9 1329.0 436.1 705.4 187.5 32.8% 53.1% 
United States 14483.2 5097.5 164.6 4858.5 74.4 3.2% 95.3% 
BMGF 1068.9 15.0 
 
14.5 0.5 0.0% 96.8% 
GHI        
GAVI 3706.5 309.7 
 
309.7 
 
0.0% 100.0% 
Global Fund 7293.5 4398.2 
 
4398.2 
 
0.0% 100.0% 
Multilateral        
AfDB 0.6 0.6 
 
0.3 0.3 0.0% 46.4% 
AfDF 202.1 202.1 36.2 110.4 55.6 17.9% 54.6% 
Arab Fund 
(AFESD) 4.8 
 AsDB Special 
Funds 200.3 200.3 
 
199.9 0.4 0.0% 99.8% 
BADEA 4.3 0.1 
 
0.1 
 
0.0% 100.0% 
GEF 0.4 0.3 
 
0.3 
 
0.0% 100.0% 
IDA 2625.3 2440.1 63.3 2376.8 
 
2.6% 97.4% 
IDB Sp.Fund 111.8 66.3 
 
66.3 
 
0.0% 100.0% 
IMF 
(Concessional 
Trust Funds) 270.8 270.8 270.8 
  
100.0% 0.0% 
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Donor 
Total ODA+ 
to RMNCH 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
delivered 
through gov't 
ODA+ to RMNCH 
to the government 
delivered as 
pooled funds 
ODA+ to RMNCH 
to the government 
delivered as 
projects 
ODA+ to RMNCH to 
the government 
modality unknown 
% ODA+ to RMNCH 
through the gov't 
delivered as 
pooled funds 
% ODA+ to RMNCH 
through the gov't 
delivered as 
projects 
Kuwait (KFAED) 18.3 12.1 
 
12.1 
 
0.0% 100.0% 
OFID 41.7 
 UNAIDS 137.0 
 UNDP 42.2 14.3 
 
13.5 0.8 0.0% 94.2% 
UNFPA 601.5 170.2 
 
134.7 35.4 0.0% 79.2% 
UNICEF 821.8 
 UNPBF 0.8 
 UNRWA 238.7 
 WFP 120.2 
      WHO 137.8 
      Grand Total 46352.4 18951.9 2437.4 15548.7 965.8 12.9% 82.0% 
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Table 5
2
. ODA+ to RMNCH by channel and modality for each recipient country income group between 2008 and 2013 (all values presented in constant 2013 
USD millions) 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
High-income 
 Total ODA+ to RMNCH 
(constant 2013 USD) 6.3 4.4 9.0 1.8 3.1 2.4 27.0 
ODA+ to RMNCH through 
government  (% of total) 5.4 (86.6%) 4.4 (65.1%) 6.7 (74.8%) 0.5 (27.7%) 1·4 (44.8%) 0.9 (36.6%) 17.8 (66.0%) 
ODA+ to RMNCH through 
gov’t pooled (% of ODA+ to 
RMNCH through gov't) 
 
1.7 (57.4%) 1·6 (24.4%) 0·1 (18·8%) 0·5 (33.2%) 0·0 (0·0%) 4.5 (25.5%) 
ODA+ to RMNCH through 
gov't project (% of ODA+ to 
RMNCH through gov't) 
 
0.7 (24.3%) 4.7 (69.1%) 0·3(67·0%) 0.9 (62.7%) 0·8 (85·3%) 8.8 (49·4%) 
Upper-middle-income 
 Total ODA+ to RMNCH 
(constant 2013 USD) 784.7 940.2 879.6 792.4 842.3 824.7 5063.8 
ODA+ to RMNCH through 
government  (% of total) 368.9 (47.0%) 502.1 (53.4%) 420.3 (47.8%) 360.9 (45.6%) 409.9 (48.7%) 410.6 (49.8%) 2,472·7 (48.8%) 
ODA+ to RMNCH through 
gov’t pooled (% of ODA+ to 
RMNCH through gov't) 
 
14.9 (3·0%) 9.0 (2.1%) 25.8 (7.1%) 57.0 (13.9%) 59.4 (14.5%) 169.3 (6.8%) 
ODA+ to RMNCH through 
gov't project (% of ODA+ to 
RMNCH through gov't) 
 
402.4 (80.1%) 393.9 (93.7) 323·7 (89.7%) 342.7 (83.6%) 340.5 (82.9%) 1,967.8 (79.6%) 
Lower-middle-income 
 Total ODA+ to RMNCH 
(constant 2013 USD) 3055.9 3730.9 4077.3 4173.0 4541.2 5183.8 24762.1 
ODA+ to RMNCH through 
government  (% of total) 1,403 (45.9%) 1,783.9 (47.8%) 1,823.9 (44.7%) 1,770.9 (42.4%) 1,670.8 (36.8%) 2,035.3 (39.3%) 
10,488.4 
(42.4%) 
                                                            
2
 Income unclassifiable includes countries not included on the World Bank classification. ODA+ to RMNCH disbursed through the government where modality was not 
identified not shown (hence percentage ODA+ to RMNCH through gov’t pooled plus ODA+ to RMNCH gov’t project does not add up to 100) 
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
ODA+ to RMNCH through 
gov’t pooled (% of ODA+ to 
RMNCH through gov't) 
 
107.6 (6.0%) 166.1 (9.1%) 328.0 (18.5%) 178.2 (10.7%) 185.4 (9.1%) 1,007.2 (9.6%) 
ODA+ to RMNCH through 
gov't project (% of ODA+ to 
RMNCH through gov't) 
 
1,331.1 (75.0%) 1,625.7 (89.1%) 1,424.5 (80.4%) 1,474.6 (88.3%) 1,830.0 (89.9%) 8,475.7 (80.9%) 
Low-income 
 Total ODA+ to RMNCH 
(constant 2013 USD) 2748.4 3162.0 3824.0 3911.4 4469.1 4932.8 23047.7 
ODA+ to RMNCH through 
government  (constant 2013 
USD) 1,292.7 (47.0%) 1,364.2 (43.1%) 1,607.7 (42.0%) 1,471.8 (37·6%) 1,476.3 (33.0%) 1,785.8 (36·2%) 8,998.5 (39.0%) 
ODA+ to RMNCH through 
gov’t pooled (% of ODA+ to 
RMNCH through gov't) 
 
149.8 (11·0%) 247·7 (15·4%) 303·5 (20.6%) 285.9 (19·4%) 311.2 (17·4%) 1,423.1 (15·8%) 
ODA+ to RMNCH through 
gov't project (% of ODA+ to 
RMNCH through gov't) 
 
918.0 (67.3%) 1,327.1 (82.5%) 1,146.6 (77.9%) 1,172.8 (79·4%) 1,460.9 (81.8%) 6,712.4 (74.6%) 
Income not classified 
 Total ODA+ to RMNCH 
(constant 2013 USD) 8.0 19.3 8.9 2.6 8.5 7.9 55.2 
ODA+ to RMNCH through 
government  (constant 2013 
USD) 8.0 (100.0%) 18.9 (97.9%) 8·5 (96.3%) 1.7 (68.2%) 8.1 (95.6%) 7.8 (96.8%) 53.0 (96.1%) 
ODA+ to RMNCH through 
gov’t pooled (% of ODA+ to 
RMNCH through gov't) 
 
1·1 (5·8%) 1·1 (12·9%) 0·6 (32·5%) 0.6 (7.6%) 0.7 (8.8%) 6.0 (11.3%) 
ODA+ to RMNCH through 
gov't project (% of ODA+ to 
RMNCH through gov't) 
 
0·2 (1·3%) 4·9 (57·8%) 1·2 (66·6%) 7·5 (92·4%) 7·0 (91.1%) 21.1 (39.8%) 
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Table 6: Annual total ODA+ to RMNCH, ODA+ to RMNCH through the government and ODA+ to RMNCH pooled by recipient country (constant 2013 US dollars; 
pooled funds not shown for 2008 because of data inaccuracy) 
 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Recipient 
country 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNC
H 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNC
H 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Afghanistan 212 64 0 313 76 0 293 81 0 315 93 0 295 76 1 309 76 1 
Albania 10 3 0 7 3 0 6 2 0 5 2 0 7 2 0 2 0 0 
Algeria 3 2 0 3 1 0 2 1 0 4 2 0 2 1 0 4 1 0 
Angola 82 13 0 55 14 0 65 13 0 49 5 0 70 12 0 78 32 0 
Anguilla 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Argentina 14 3 0 8 7 0 6 0 0 2 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 
Armenia 9 2 0 11 4 1 11 5 3 11 5 4 8 4 1 6 3 1 
Azerbaijan 6 3 0 7 4 0 10 4 0 11 8 0 8 5 0 10 5 0 
Bangladesh 151 21 0 233 120 0 212 77 4 202 26 21 210 76 18 337 122 18 
Barbados 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0   0   0   0 
Belarus 4 1 0 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 4 0 0 
Belize 0 0 0 2 0 0 3 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 5 2 0 
Benin 46 17 5 62 28 3 71 26 2 72 27 3 56 16 1 63 7 1 
Bhutan 3 3 0 2 2 1 3 2 0 2 1 0 3 2 0 3 1 0 
Bolivia 39 7 2 40 7 4 38 10 6 36 12 7 38 12 0 34 4 0 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
11 4 0 11 8 0 14 9 0 10 5 0 11 8 0 10 3 0 
Botswana 94 27 0 103 38 0 46 36 0 45 35 0 30 28 0 40 28 0 
Brazil 8 3 0 11 1 0 13 4 0 10 2 0 5 2 0 4 1 0 
Burkina Faso 78 48 6 92 53 16 114 72 14 64 32 14 103 38 9 107 54 9 
Page 48 of 68Health Affairs
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Recipient 
country 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNC
H 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNC
H 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Burundi 46 29 2 50 25 3 65 31 2 61 18 1 53 14 1 74 33 1 
Cambodia 72 38 0 90 46 3 121 55 6 113 64 0 100 25 0 102 41 0 
Cameroon 34 16 4 50 30 1 38 17 0 86 53 0 58 22 1 77 41 1 
Cape Verde 3 3 0 3 2 1 5 5 0 6 3 0 3 3 0 5 4 0 
Central 
African 
Republic 
22 5 2 15 3 0 20 6 0 21 1 1 21 3 0 30 5 0 
Chad 32 13 0 33 7 0 59 5 0 41 7 0 47 7 0 83 33 0 
Chile 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
China 
(People's 
Republic of) 
106 55 0 103 79 1 84 61 0 49 29 0 52 37 0 31 20 0 
Colombia 8 1 0 6 0 0 12 2 0 11 5 0 8 2 0 42 31 0 
Comoros 1 0 0 2 1 0 6 2 0 4 2 0 6 4 0 7 3 0 
Congo, Rep. 14 8 0 7 4 0 27 8 0 20 6 0 13 6 0 15 6 0 
Cook Islands 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Costa Rica 3 0 0 3 1 0 3 1 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 
Cote d'Ivoire 62 25 9 75 41 1 111 54 7 82 46 5 80 46 4 105 70 4 
Croatia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   0   0   0 
Cuba 5 1 0 2 0 0 5 1 0 3 0 0 3 0 0 4 0 0 
Democratic 
People's 
Republic of 
Korea 
7 0 0 15 0 0 17  0 8 0 0 15 0 0 19 0 0 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo 
226 61 18 268 70 4 310 71 6 330 80 0 376 78 1 434 77 1 
Djibouti 10 6 1 10 6 0 6 3 0 7 3 2 12 6 0 8 2 0 
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 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Recipient 
country 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNC
H 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNC
H 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Dominica 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Dominican 
Republic 
18 10 0 19 9 1 23 11 0 22 4 2 23 9 0 23 13 0 
Ecuador 14 8 0 10 3 0 8 2 0 5 1 0 4 1 0 5 2 0 
Egypt 65 32 0 31 10 14 35 19 9 18 12 0 17 4 0 11 7 0 
El Salvador 14 3 0 16 4 0 19 5 0 15 4 0 14 4 0 15 6 0 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
9 1 0 6 0 0 7 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Eritrea 24 16 0 20 10 0 37 27 0 15 8 0 20 17 0 26 18 0 
Ethiopia 349 174 8 378 196 27 479 265 59 561 193 71 515 174 87 687 363 87 
Fiji 4 1 0 3 1 0 4 1 0 3 1 0 12 1 0 5 1 0 
Former 
Yugoslav 
Republic of 
Macedonia 
2 2 0 1 1 0 2 1 0 2 2 0 1 1 0 2 2 0 
Gabon 4 1 0 6 5 0 3 2 0 3 2 0 3 2 0 4 3 0 
Gambia 9 7 1 12 10 0 15 9 0 13 7 1 13 6 0 22 11 0 
Georgia 16 6 5 15 8 4 16 9 2 14 4 2 15 3 0 10 1 0 
Ghana 104 67 19 163 83 37 156 87 34 150 61 40 197 93 6 203 83 6 
Grenada 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0  0 
Guatemala 44 8 0 32 9 0 26 4 3 36 15 0 34 10 0 31 6 0 
Guinea 25 14 0 23 6 0 35 15 0 27 12 1 40 12 1 33 10 1 
Guinea-
Bissau 
9 3 1 10 6 1 15 11 0 10 4 0 5 1 0 21 11 0 
Guyana 18 10 0 18 11 0 15 10 0 11 7 0 9 5 0 7 5 0 
Haiti 90 27 3 110 38 7 183 61 1 190 53 0 139 44 0 142 45 0 
Honduras 37 16 0 35 7 3 42 13 0 40 13 0 47 20 0 50 7 0 
Page 50 of 68Health Affairs
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Recipient 
country 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNC
H 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNC
H 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
India 414 324 4 467 361 11 458 321 45 594 371 1 486 293 99 400 234 99 
Indonesia 111 64 0 102 51 0 126 71 0 96 54 1 125 59 1 135 83 1 
Iran 5 0 0 1 0 0 5 0 0 7 0 0 11 0 0 6 0 0 
Iraq 34 20 0 44 6 0 37 7 0 13 2 0 21 1 0 20 1 0 
Jamaica 6 4 0 5 4 0 6 5 0 6 4 0 3 2 0 6 4 0 
Jordan 32 2 0 53 11 0 52 7 11 66 13 14 83 21 0 57 6 0 
Kazakhstan 9 6 0 11 3 0 10 5 0 5 3 0 11 9 0 7 4 0 
Kenya 228 112 5 329 139 0 427 179 6 473 179 4 533 206 4 592 253 4 
Kiribati 3 2 0 2 1 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 
Kosovo   0 5 1 0 4 1 0 4 1 0 5 1 0 2 1 0 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
19 12 1 16 11 2 17 12 5 18 11 2 14 7 2 14 6 2 
Lao People's 
Democratic 
Republic 
22 15 1 21 15 0 30 19 1 29 20 0 33 20 0 35 24 0 
Lebanon 15 3 0 14 1 0 16 3 0 11 1 0 20 1 0 25 1 0 
Lesotho 20 15 1 23 17 11 40 31 4 54 38 5 57 38 1 66 50 1 
Liberia 63 28 1 58 14 3 62 14 5 71 18 19 77 35 18 74 34 18 
Libya 13 12 0 8 8 0 0 0 0 4 1 0 3 1 0 2 0 0 
Madagascar 71 30 0 57 14 0 103 26 0 61 13 0 73 7 0 113 17 0 
Malawi 152 100 7 153 81 22 141 65 11 187 90 20 256 115 17 262 97 17 
Malaysia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Maldives 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 2 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 
Mali 77 31 14 89 41 8 104 24 34 134 51 4 137 18 15 157 25 15 
Marshall 
Islands 
4 4 4 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 7 7 0 0 0 0 
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 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Recipient 
country 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNC
H 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNC
H 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Mauritania 14 7 0 12 3 1 13 3 1 12 4 1 14 2 0 14 4 0 
Mauritius 1 1 2 3 3 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 0 1 0 0 
Mayotte 4 4 0 2 2 1 5 5 0   0   0   0 
Mexico 3 1 0 3 1 0 3 0 0 4 0 0 5 0 0 4 0 0 
Micronesia, 
Fed. States 
7 7 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 12 12 0 0 0 0 
Moldova 13 6 0 16 10 8 31 21 14 24 17 7 21 14 0 12 3 0 
Mongolia 6 2 0 5 2 1 8 5 0 9 7 0 11 7 0 10 8 0 
Montenegro 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Montserrat 1 1 0 0 0 0   0 1  0 0  0 0 0 0 
Morocco 17 14 0 30 25 1 29 22 3 20 17 5 23 14 8 37 15 8 
Mozambique 219 125 17 228 117 50 287 178 57 289 161 57 311 163 63 340 169 63 
Myanmar 44 3 0 36 4 0 47 1 0 40 1 0 107 2 10 125 14 10 
Namibia 40 22 0 71 57 0 74 50 0 55 29 0 71 47 0 63 35 0 
Nauru 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Nepal 61 33 0 57 26 6 82 26 7 63 27 6 63 22 7 70 30 7 
Nicaragua 47 19 3 56 15 7 48 13 4 50 23 2 41 14 0 33 6 0 
Niger 70 23 0 71 19 3 89 19 7 80 19 4 70 20 1 85 20 1 
Nigeria 373 192 0 649 342 14 445 216 9 556 238 4 675 235 6 954 480 6 
Niue 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Oman 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pakistan 176 66 1 269 80 1 360 117 94 362 167 0 401 86 0 455 90 0 
Palau 1 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Panama 1 1 0 3 1 0 3 0 0 2 0 0 3 1 0 3 1 0 
Papua New 
Guinea 
59 17 0 66 21 10 52 16 1 78 8 1 78 5 1 95 3 1 
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 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Recipient 
country 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNC
H 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNC
H 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Paraguay 9 4 0 12 3 0 14 4 0 6 1 0 7 2 0 5 1 0 
Peru 28 5 0 70 39 0 34 4 0 22 1 24 43 28 23 36 26 23 
Philippines 45 8 0 52 17 2 64 10 8 55 17 4 55 13 0 63 6 0 
Rwanda 131 78 12 156 99 16 180 121 17 191 119 4 191 117 8 170 99 8 
Saint Helena 1 1 1 1 1 0 3 2 0 1 1 0 7 7 0 7 7 0 
Saint Kitts 
and Nevis 
0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0  0 
Saint Lucia 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 3 3 0 2 2 0 
Saint Vincent 
and the 
Grenadines 
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Samoa 1 1 0 2 1 2 4 3 0 1 1 3 5 4 4 5 5 4 
Sao Tome 
and Principe 
4 1 0 2 1 0 3 1 0 5 1 0 3 1 0 7 1 0 
Senegal 65 19 7 76 33 2 69 23 8 83 25 8 100 39 0 95 29 0 
Serbia 8 4 3 13 11 3 7 5 0 10 5 0 5 3 0 8 2 0 
Seychelles 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sierra Leone 36 16 2 52 15 3 57 19 1 55 23 1 51 15 1 75 14 1 
Solomon 
Islands 
9 5 0 10 5 6 10 8 6 12 10 4 8 5 6 13 10 6 
Somalia 34 3 0 52 0 0 50 0 0 48 0 0 93 0 0 75 1 0 
South Africa 220 113 0 307 160 0 356 158 23 383 163 18 390 180 31 373 187 31 
South Sudan  0   0   0 65 5 12 155 23 28 162 34 28 
Sri Lanka 16 11 0 26 12 0 27 15 0 18 8 0 16 7 0 15 8 0 
States Ex-
Yugoslavia 
0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sudan 133 17 0 115 8 0 180 18 0 87 8 0 115 8 0 127 7 0 
Suriname 3 2 2 9 8 0 4 4 0 4 4 0 1 1 0 2 2 0 
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 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Recipient 
country 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNC
H 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNC
H 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Swaziland 12 9 0 21 14 0 39 28 0 42 19 0 35 15 0 41 24 0 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
12 2 0 16 7 0 12 5 0 6 1 0 18 0 0 62 3 0 
Tajikistan 16 4 2 16 5 3 27 8 1 14 3 1 22 6 0 22 6 0 
Tanzania 321 225 39 342 217 55 434 266 68 413 244 39 468 166 49 589 311 49 
Thailand 31 20 0 21 12 0 26 17 0 38 27 0 33 10 0 43 20 0 
Timor-Leste 14 1 0 11 4 0 19 10 0 14 4 0 25 5 0 16 3 0 
Togo 21 7 2 27 10 3 26 12 1 32 16 0 10 6 0 36 12 0 
Tokelau 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tonga 1 1 0 1 1 0 2 1 0 4 4 1 3 2 1 1 1 1 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
2 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tunisia 10 10 1 4 3 0 3 2 0 2 1 0 6 5 0 5 3 0 
Turkey 4 3 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 
Turkmenista
n 
2 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Tuvalu 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Uganda 182 78 4 234 126 14 278 122 4 286 112 7 404 212 3 356 131 3 
Ukraine 28 6 0 27 4 0 26 2 0 28 2 0 18 3 0 11 5 0 
Uruguay 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Uzbekistan 16 5 0 19 3 0 21 5 0 16 3 0 24 10 0 19 11 0 
Vanuatu 3 2 0 4 3 0 3 2 0 2 0 1 4 2 1 7 4 1 
Venezuela 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Vietnam 80 50 16 78 66 3 100 62 3 109 69 6 99 68 6 115 82 6 
Wallis and 
Futuna 
0 0 0 15 15 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
West Bank 67 11 3 63 6 3 195 120 26 98 30 5 98 10 0 57 4 0 
Page 54 of 68Health Affairs
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Recipient 
country 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNC
H 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
Total 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNC
H 
ODA+ to 
RMNCH 
through 
gov’t 
ODA+ 
to 
RMNCH 
pooled 
and Gaza 
Strip 
Yemen 43 18 0 38 14 1 52 17 0 43 8 1 91 28 0 147 54 0 
Zambia 187 87 19 194 95 11 176 74 12 250 84 15 264 103 8 331 88 8 
Zimbabwe 68 19 0 106 23 0 143 10 0 121 9 14 309 28 0 215 19 0 
Grand Total 6603 3078 275 7857 3672 426 8799 3867 658 8881 3606 522 9864 3567 557 10952 4240 557 
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Table 7: Number of countries supported and Theil index by donor between 2003 and 2013 (presented in two or three year averages) 
Time period 2006-2008 2009-2011 2012-2013 2006-2013 average 
Donor 
Avg. No. 
countries 
Supported 
Theil 
Index 
Avg. No. 
countries 
Supported 
Theil 
Index 
Avg. No. 
countries 
Supported 
Theil 
Index 
Avg. No. 
countries 
Supported 
Theil 
Index 
AfDB 
    
2.0 0.67 0.7 0.22 
AfDF 28.3 0.31 18.0 0.50 16.5 0.75 20.9 0.52 
Arab Fund 
(AFESD) 
1.7 0.76 3.7 0.82 4.5 0.66 
3.3 0.75 
AsDB Special 
Funds 
 
27.0 1.64 10.5 0.87 
12.5 0.84 
Australia 36.0 1.46 59.3 1.81 54.0 1.24 49.8 1.50 
Austria 52.7 1.50 40.3 1.21 62.0 1.23 51.7 1.31 
BADEA 
  
1.7 0.07 7.0 0.32 2.9 0.13 
Belgium 55.0 1.20 64.3 1.49 51.0 1.19 56.8 1.29 
Bill & Melinda 
Gates 
Foundation 
  
53.0 1.49 66.5 1.91 
39.8 1.13 
Canada 73.0 1.20 95.0 1.59 84.0 1.48 84.0 1.42 
Czech 
Republic 
 
7.7 0.83 22.5 0.70 
10.1 0.51 
Denmark 36.0 0.93 44.0 1.20 30.0 1.34 36.7 1.16 
Estonia 
 
4.5 0.38 1.5 0.13 
EU 
Institutions 
106.3 0.89 115.7 0.96 110.0 0.92 
110.7 0.92 
Finland 48.0 1.18 59.3 1.00 57.5 0.86 54.9 1.01 
France 48.7 1.19 68.0 1.06 62.0 1.22 59.6 1.16 
GAVI 67.7 0.84 69.7 0.81 71.5 0.86 69.6 0.84 
GEF 0.3 0.00 0.3 
 
4.0 0.22 1.6 0.07 
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Time period 2006-2008 2009-2011 2012-2013 2006-2013 average 
Germany 90.0 1.28 92.7 1.22 93.0 1.25 91.9 1.25 
Global Fund 105.3 0.83 106.7 0.82 115.5 0.92 109.2 0.86 
Greece 37.7 0.83 22.0 2.10 10.0 2.32 23.2 1.75 
Iceland 
  
1.3 0.39 5.0 1.04 2.1 0.48 
IDA 69.3 0.80 64.7 1.31 53.0 1.06 62.3 1.06 
IDB Sp.Fund 
  
11.0 1.16 13.5 1.71 8.2 0.96 
IMF 
(Concessional 
Trust Funds) 
29.7 0.65 34.3 0.73 26.0 0.58 
30.0 0.65 
Ireland 62.0 1.46 50.7 1.50 40.0 1.15 50.9 1.37 
Italy 81.7 1.12 82.7 0.91 74.5 0.90 79.6 0.98 
Japan 126.3 1.05 126.3 1.02 126.0 1.10 126.2 1.06 
Korea 60.7 0.97 64.7 1.22 60.5 0.99 61.9 1.06 
Kuwait 
(KFAED) 
 
4.0 0.89 3.5 0.19 
2.5 0.36 
Luxembourg 46.3 1.10 48.7 1.04 42.5 1.26 45.8 1.13 
Netherlands 43.3 1.07 33.3 1.06 25.0 0.93 33.9 1.02 
New Zealand 21.7 1.34 21.7 1.25 17.0 1.06 20.1 1.22 
Norway 70.3 1.13 65.3 1.28 64.0 1.35 66.6 1.25 
OFID 
  
14.0 0.85 18.5 0.68 10.8 0.51 
Poland 
 
12.0 0.91 4.0 0.30 
Portugal 7.7 0.47 7.7 0.87 6.5 0.55 7.3 0.63 
Slovak 
Republic 
    
4.0 0.88 
1.3 0.29 
Slovenia 
 
11.0 0.51 14.0 2.20 8.3 0.90 
Spain 78.3 0.76 79.3 0.86 64.0 0.97 73.9 0.86 
Sweden 94.3 1.39 87.7 1.34 81.5 1.26 87.8 1.33 
Switzerland 59.7 1.09 56.7 1.21 53.0 0.92 56.4 1.07 
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Time period 2006-2008 2009-2011 2012-2013 2006-2013 average 
UNAIDS 114.3 0.59 105.0 0.45 97.0 0.43 105.4 0.49 
UNDP 66.3 1.00 69.3 1.06 62.0 1.17 65.9 1.08 
UNFPA 115.0 0.52 116.3 0.46 116.5 0.43 115.9 0.47 
UNICEF 116.0 0.93 116.3 1.07 114.5 1.11 115.6 1.04 
United Arab 
Emirates 
  
24.0 1.65 23.0 1.32 
15.7 0.99 
United 
Kingdom 
55.3 1.14 52.3 1.37 52.5 1.10 
53.4 1.20 
United States 108.0 1.10 111.3 1.28 112.5 1.27 110.6 1.22 
UNPBF 
  
1.3 0.11 0.5 
 
0.6 0.04 
UNRWA 4.0 0.17 4.0 0.20 4.0 0.25 4.0 0.21 
WFP 
  
44.7 0.76 39.0 0.97 27.9 0.58 
WHO 
 
36.7 0.31 111.0 0.34 49.2 0.22 
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Table 8: Total ODA+ to RMNCH (2013 USD millions), average number of donors and average HHI by region 
Time period 2006-2008 2009-2011 2012-2013 Change 
East Asia & Pacific     
Total ODA+ to RMNCH 587.43 680.05 808.20 220.89 
Average No Donors 10.34 11.67 12.46 2.12 
HHI 0.51 0.37 0.44 -0.07 
Europe & Central Asia     
Total ODA+ to RMNCH 176.27 187.57 158.82 -17.45 
Average No Donors 14.42 14.22 13.86 -0.56 
HHI 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.03 
Latin America & Caribbean     
Total ODA+ to RMNCH 378.54 494.62 448.85 70.31 
Average No Donors 10.02 11.73 11.17 1.15 
HHI 0.39 0.36 0.44 0.06 
Middle East & North America     
Total ODA+ to RMNCH 347.38 352.83 422.08 74.70 
Average No Donors 13.27 16.76 20.00 6.73 
HHI 0.38 0.30 0.25 -0.12 
South Asia     
Total ODA+ to RMNCH 949.52 1454.09 1532.84 583.32 
Average No Donors 20.58 24.00 23.50 2.92 
HHI 0.19 0.15 0.15 -0.04 
Sub-Saharan Africa     
Total ODA+ to RMNCH 3,343.53 5,344.22 7,030.45 3,686.91 
Average No Donors 19.94 22.52 22.04 2.11 
HHI 0.23 0.26 0.26 0.03 
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Table 9: Number of donors and Herfindahl-Hirschman index by recipient country between 2003 and 2013 (presented in two or three year averages) 
  2006-2008 2009-2011 2012-2013 2006-2013 average 
Recipient country 
Average no. 
of donors 
HH-
index 
Average no. 
of donors 
HH-
index 
Average no. 
of donors 
HH-
index 
Average no. 
of donors 
HH-
index 
Afghanistan 26.67 0.2 32 0.2 32 0.14 30.2 0.18 
Albania 19.67 0.13 17.33 0.13 14.5 0.33 17.2 0.20 
Algeria 12.33 0.17 14.33 0.17 13.5 0.43 13.4 0.26 
Angola 24.67 0.13 23 0.25 21 0.27 22.9 0.22 
Anguilla 0.33 1 0.33 1 0.5 1 0.4 1.00 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
1.67 0.36 1.33 0.84 0.5 1 
1.2 0.73 
Argentina 14 0.22 14.33 0.36 12 0.19 13.4 0.26 
Armenia 18.67 0.32 17.33 0.25 16 0.17 17.3 0.25 
Azerbaijan 13.33 0.26 14 0.22 14 0.22 13.8 0.23 
Bangladesh 24.67 0.11 28.33 0.12 28.5 0.12 27.2 0.12 
Barbados 3 0.73 3 0.6 13 0.56 6.3 0.63 
Belarus 14.33 0.27 14.67 0.11 
  
9.7 0.13 
Belize 4.67 0.33 7.67 0.54 8 0.24 6.8 0.37 
Benin 25 0.11 25.67 0.15 25.5 0.17 25.4 0.14 
Bhutan 10 0.19 11.33 0.14 12 0.19 11.1 0.17 
Bolivia 20.67 0.14 24 0.16 25.5 0.14 23.4 0.15 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
23 0.11 19.67 0.23 18 0.2 
20.2 0.18 
Botswana 12.33 0.87 16 0.85 12 0.85 13.4 0.86 
Brazil 18 0.14 19 0.18 18.5 0.16 18.5 0.16 
Burkina Faso 26 0.09 27.33 0.11 28.5 0.13 27.3 0.11 
Burundi 24.33 0.13 28 0.12 26 0.14 26.1 0.13 
Cambodia 25 0.17 30.33 0.17 30 0.13 28.4 0.16 
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  2006-2008 2009-2011 2012-2013 2006-2013 average 
Recipient country 
Average no. 
of donors 
HH-
index 
Average no. 
of donors 
HH-
index 
Average no. 
of donors 
HH-
index 
Average no. 
of donors 
HH-
index 
Cameroon 24.33 0.19 25.33 0.26 26.5 0.2 25.4 0.22 
Cape Verde 10.33 0.22 13.67 0.21 7 0.37 10.3 0.27 
Central African 
Republic 
15 0.18 19.33 0.11 22.5 0.15 
18.9 0.15 
Chad 21.33 0.09 25.33 0.11 22 0.16 22.9 0.12 
Chile 10.33 0.33 13.33 0.29 10 0.31 11.2 0.31 
China (People's 
Republic of) 
24.67 0.14 26 0.2 25 0.16 
25.2 0.17 
Colombia 16 0.17 20.33 0.22 19 0.42 18.4 0.27 
Comoros 7.67 0.22 10 0.26 12.5 0.17 10.1 0.22 
Congo, Rep. 15.67 0.16 19 0.21 16 0.21 16.9 0.19 
Cook Islands 2.33 0.57 2 0.29 3.5 0.46 2.6 0.44 
Costa Rica 9.33 0.28 10.33 0.43 7.5 0.57 9.1 0.43 
Cote d'Ivoire 20.33 0.26 23.67 0.25 22.5 0.22 22.2 0.24 
Croatia 7.33 0.26 5.67 0.25 
  
4.3 0.17 
Cuba 12.33 0.33 12 0.27 12.5 0.5 12.3 0.37 
Democratic 
People's Republic of 
Korea 
13 0.17 10 0.19 13.5 0.2 
12.2 0.19 
Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo 
27.33 0.1 31.67 0.1 30.5 0.13 
29.8 0.11 
Djibouti 12 0.18 17.33 0.09 15.5 0.09 14.9 0.12 
Dominica 2.67 0.27 3.33 0.26 2.5 0.57 2.8 0.37 
Dominican Republic 13.67 0.28 14 0.35 11.5 0.4 13.1 0.34 
Ecuador 17 0.19 20 0.17 17.5 0.15 18.2 0.17 
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  2006-2008 2009-2011 2012-2013 2006-2013 average 
Recipient country 
Average no. 
of donors 
HH-
index 
Average no. 
of donors 
HH-
index 
Average no. 
of donors 
HH-
index 
Average no. 
of donors 
HH-
index 
Egypt 22 0.34 23.67 0.3 21 0.28 22.2 0.31 
El Salvador 15 0.22 18.33 0.2 19 0.26 17.4 0.23 
Equatorial Guinea 6.33 0.42 6.67 0.46 6.5 0.27 6.5 0.38 
Eritrea 17.67 0.18 18.33 0.35 14 0.52 16.7 0.35 
Ethiopia 26.67 0.15 32.33 0.2 31.5 0.18 30.2 0.18 
Fiji 7 0.29 5.67 0.26 9.5 0.55 7.4 0.37 
Former Yugoslav 
Republic of 
Macedonia 
13.67 0.2 10 0.42 9 0.45 
10.9 0.36 
Gabon 10.33 0.52 9.67 0.34 11.5 0.21 10.5 0.36 
Gambia 15.67 0.33 17.67 0.48 15 0.34 16.1 0.38 
Georgia 17.33 0.2 16.67 0.24 17 0.31 17.0 0.25 
Ghana 25 0.11 30.33 0.13 30 0.16 28.4 0.13 
Grenada 2.33 0.64 2.67 0.35 1 0.59 2.0 0.53 
Guatemala 19 0.23 21 0.2 20 0.29 20.0 0.24 
Guinea 19.67 0.13 18.67 0.18 21 0.15 19.8 0.15 
Guinea-Bissau 16.33 0.12 19.33 0.24 16.5 0.39 17.4 0.25 
Guyana 9 0.42 10.67 0.34 10.5 0.49 10.1 0.42 
Haiti 17.33 0.39 26.67 0.27 25 0.45 23.0 0.37 
Honduras 15.67 0.18 20.67 0.12 21 0.22 19.1 0.17 
India 25 0.15 29 0.17 31 0.14 28.3 0.15 
Indonesia 23.33 0.12 24.33 0.17 23.5 0.16 23.7 0.15 
Iran 7.67 0.41 9 0.44 10.5 0.5 9.1 0.45 
Iraq 18.33 0.52 21.33 0.46 22 0.37 20.6 0.45 
Jamaica 9.33 0.35 9 0.46 6.5 0.36 8.3 0.39 
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Jordan 18.67 0.33 22.67 0.31 24.5 0.36 21.9 0.33 
Kazakhstan 11.67 0.35 13.33 0.24 12 0.46 12.3 0.35 
Kenya 28 0.24 31.67 0.32 34.5 0.36 31.4 0.31 
Kiribati 4.67 0.48 5 0.32 5.5 0.41 5.1 0.40 
Kosovo 
  
13.67 0.14 13.5 0.22 9.1 0.12 
Kyrgyz Republic 17 0.12 19.67 0.11 21 0.11 19.2 0.11 
Lao People's 
Democratic 
Republic 
21 0.17 27.33 0.1 27.5 0.1 
25.3 0.12 
Lebanon 23.33 0.2 22.33 0.35 24.5 0.24 23.4 0.26 
Lesotho 16 0.22 20.33 0.33 17 0.48 17.8 0.34 
Liberia 20.33 0.1 25.33 0.19 21 0.22 22.2 0.17 
Libya 3.33 0.73 7.67 0.41 12.5 0.18 7.8 0.44 
Madagascar 22.67 0.15 25.33 0.25 25 0.24 24.3 0.21 
Malawi 26.67 0.14 29.67 0.15 31.5 0.17 29.3 0.15 
Malaysia 8.67 0.42 10 0.27 9.5 0.24 9.4 0.31 
Maldives 6 0.38 8.33 0.18 7.5 0.21 7.3 0.26 
Mali 24.67 0.09 28.67 0.13 29.5 0.14 27.6 0.12 
Marshall Islands 3 0.95 2.33 0.87 3.5 0.9 2.9 0.91 
Mauritania 16.67 0.31 18 0.14 19.5 0.14 18.1 0.20 
Mauritius 4 0.63 5.67 0.63 5.5 0.38 5.1 0.55 
Mayotte 0.67 1 0.67 1 
  
0.4 0.67 
Mexico 11 0.28 15.67 0.19 15 0.31 13.9 0.26 
Micronesia, Fed. 
States 
2 0.98 3 0.91 3.5 0.93 
2.8 0.94 
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Moldova 17.33 0.18 19 0.25 20 0.15 18.8 0.19 
Mongolia 17.33 0.13 20 0.11 23 0.16 20.1 0.13 
Montenegro 7.67 0.27 8.33 0.36 7 0.49 7.7 0.37 
Montserrat 0.67 1 1 0.91 1 1 0.9 0.97 
Morocco 16.67 0.18 17.33 0.22 19.5 0.26 17.8 0.22 
Mozambique 29.33 0.11 33 0.23 35.5 0.23 32.6 0.19 
Myanmar 18.67 0.09 20.67 0.1 24.5 0.14 21.3 0.11 
Namibia 18.33 0.4 16.67 0.52 16 0.51 17.0 0.48 
Nauru 2.33 0.97 1.67 0.52 2 0.95 2.0 0.81 
Nepal 25.33 0.16 29 0.13 29.5 0.14 27.9 0.14 
Nicaragua 26 0.09 27 0.08 24 0.1 25.7 0.09 
Niger 24 0.1 26.33 0.13 25.5 0.1 25.3 0.11 
Nigeria 23 0.21 26.33 0.2 22 0.16 23.8 0.19 
Niue 2.33 0.95 1.67 0.82 2.5 0.9 2.2 0.89 
Oman 1.33 0.52 1.33 0.5 
  
0.9 0.34 
Pakistan 21.33 0.18 27 0.14 23.5 0.19 23.9 0.17 
Palau 2.67 0.81 4.67 0.61 5 0.44 4.1 0.62 
Panama 7.33 0.23 9 0.46 7.5 0.27 7.9 0.32 
Papua New Guinea 15.67 0.55 16 0.29 16.5 0.42 16.1 0.42 
Paraguay 11.33 0.23 14.67 0.2 12 0.21 12.7 0.21 
Peru 21.33 0.22 22 0.25 20 0.4 21.1 0.29 
Philippines 21 0.28 20.67 0.18 22.5 0.22 21.4 0.23 
Rwanda 27 0.22 29.33 0.3 27.5 0.31 27.9 0.28 
Saint Helena 1 1 1.33 0.99 2 0.99 1.4 0.99 
Saint Kitts and 1 0.94 1 0.65 1.5 0.87 1.2 0.82 
Page 64 of 68Health Affairs
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
  2006-2008 2009-2011 2012-2013 2006-2013 average 
Recipient country 
Average no. 
of donors 
HH-
index 
Average no. 
of donors 
HH-
index 
Average no. 
of donors 
HH-
index 
Average no. 
of donors 
HH-
index 
Nevis 
Saint Lucia 3 0.66 5 0.55 2.5 0.75 3.5 0.65 
Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines 
2.67 0.89 3.67 0.31 2.5 0.86 
2.9 0.69 
Samoa 5.67 0.27 5.67 0.25 5.5 0.31 5.6 0.28 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
10.67 0.24 11.67 0.21 12 0.22 
11.4 0.22 
Saudi Arabia 1 0.98 
    
0.3 0.33 
Senegal 24 0.14 27.67 0.16 29.5 0.2 27.1 0.17 
Serbia 18.67 0.14 16 0.49 15 0.57 16.6 0.40 
Seychelles 3 0.42 5.33 0.24 5.5 0.33 4.6 0.33 
Sierra Leone 20 0.11 23.33 0.17 25.5 0.17 22.9 0.15 
Solomon Islands 4.33 0.83 7 0.31 8.5 0.7 6.6 0.61 
Somalia 19 0.11 24.67 0.13 26.5 0.16 23.4 0.13 
South Africa 23.67 0.45 24 0.68 24 0.51 23.9 0.55 
South Sudan 
   
26.5 0.12 8.8 0.04 
Sri Lanka 25.67 0.18 27 0.11 24 0.11 25.6 0.13 
States Ex-Yugoslavia 4.33 0.34 1.33 0.74 2 0.53 2.6 0.54 
Sudan 23 0.11 28.67 0.16 26.5 0.24 26.1 0.17 
Suriname 5.33 0.51 5 0.42 5 0.42 5.1 0.45 
Swaziland 13.33 0.42 16 0.34 16.5 0.4 15.3 0.39 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
11.67 0.22 13.33 0.23 26.5 0.11 
17.2 0.19 
Tajikistan 19 0.12 23 0.11 21.5 0.13 21.2 0.12 
Tanzania 28.33 0.15 31.33 0.21 34.5 0.18 31.4 0.18 
Thailand 16.33 0.42 19 0.41 18.5 0.36 17.9 0.40 
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Timor-Leste 15.67 0.16 17.33 0.19 19 0.2 17.3 0.18 
Togo 18 0.25 22.67 0.25 21 0.31 20.6 0.27 
Tokelau 1 1 1.67 0.85 2.5 0.95 1.7 0.93 
Tonga 6 0.42 4.33 0.38 4 0.41 4.8 0.40 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
4 0.49 3.33 0.32 
  2.4 0.27 
Tunisia 9 0.59 12.33 0.22 16.5 0.17 12.6 0.33 
Turkey 10.67 0.85 9.33 0.21 9 0.25 9.7 0.44 
Turkmenistan 5.67 0.4 8.67 0.24 6 0.28 6.8 0.31 
Turks and Caicos 
Islands 
0.33 1 
    0.1 0.33 
Tuvalu 2.33 0.7 2.67 0.22 4 0.35 3.0 0.42 
Uganda 27.67 0.25 29.67 0.36 32 0.3 29.8 0.30 
Ukraine 19 0.32 20.67 0.38 18 0.27 19.2 0.32 
Uruguay 7.67 0.24 9.67 0.16 9.5 0.24 8.9 0.21 
Uzbekistan 15.67 0.13 16 0.19 16 0.15 15.9 0.16 
Vanuatu 4.67 0.62 5.67 0.27 5 0.42 5.1 0.44 
Venezuela 8 0.24 9.67 0.16 6.5 0.34 8.1 0.25 
Vietnam 28 0.08 31 0.1 30.5 0.12 29.8 0.10 
Wallis and Futuna 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.0 1.00 
West Bank and 
Gaza Strip 
23.67 0.16 30.67 0.3 29.5 0.16 
27.9 0.21 
Yemen 18 0.15 21.33 0.16 24 0.15 21.1 0.15 
Zambia 27.67 0.19 28.33 0.3 25.5 0.29 27.2 0.26 
Zimbabwe 26 0.16 27.67 0.15 24 0.22 25.9 0.18 
All recipients       15.4 0.32 
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